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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Issue: Whether Mr. Hall has made any showing whatsoever that the District Court's
findings were not adequately supported by evidence at trial; and, therefore, whether such
findings supported the District Court's legal determinations.
Standard of Review: "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case." Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).

II.

Issue: Whether Mr. Hall was denied any due process rights where his counterclaim put
the child support arrearage issue squarely before the District Court.
Standard of Review: Inasmuch as this issue is raised by Mr. Hall for the first time on
appeal, this Court should decline to address this claim.1 Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).

III.

Issue: Whether the District Court, in setting aside the child support provisions of the 1995
Order Modifying the Divorce Decree, properly determined that such order was procured
by fraud.

1

"[I]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal." Monson
v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). "This rule
applies to all claims, including constitutional questions . . . " Id.
4

Standard of Review: In reviewing that court's legal conclusions, this court applies a
correction of error standard. Roderick v. Ricks. 54 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
RULE 60(b). UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(b) Mistakes: inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action (Amended effective April 1, 1998.) (emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(3)
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This case involves a Petition by Respondent to modify a previous modification Order (the
1995 Order) of a Divorce Decree and a Counter Petition by Petitioner for a judgment against
Respondent for $25,000.00 for arrears of support.
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Course of Proceedings:
The case was referred for trial by the Commissioner. Trial was held before The
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on August 14, 2003.
Disposition at Trial Court:
The District Court granted Ms. Hall's Petition and established child support for a child in
custody of Ms. Hall's parents and established child support to be paid by Ms. Hall to Mr. Hall for
the two (2) children in the custody of Mr. Hall. The District Court further denied Mr. Hall's
Counter Petition for $25,000.00 for arrears in support and, based upon the evidence presented at
trial, determined that no sums were due from Ms. Hall to Mr. Hall based upon Mr. Hall's fraud
on the Court and for the further reason that it was undisputed that between June 12, 1995, and
June 17, 2002, Ms. Hall had no income.
Relevant Facts:
1.

That a Decree of Divorce was entered on December 2, 1991. (R. 24).

2.

That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Hall was awarded the care, custody

and control of the parties' three children, and Mr. Hall was ordered to pay $450.00 per month for
the support of the children. (R. 24-26).
3.

That all divorce documents were prepared by Mr. Hall. (R. 205, Transcript p. 19,

1. 8-10).
4.

That Mr. Hall never had any knowledge of Ms. Hall's income in that he never

filed income tax returns with Ms. Hall and has not filed personal income tax returns since 1993,
as far as he could remember. (R. 205, Transcript p. 6,1. 15-25; p. 7,1. 1-9).
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5.

Ms. Hall had a ninth grade education and had a child at age fifteen. (R. 205,

Transcript p. 18,1. 11-15).
6.

That Ms. Hall has a hearing disability and had basically no income between June

12, 1995, the date of the modification, until June of 2002, at which time she commenced earning
$350.00 per month cleaning houses. (R. 178, Transcript p. 7,1. 12-16; p. 22,1. 23-25; p. 23,1. 110) (Exhibit 1 Hearing Tests).
7.

That on or about August 22, 1994, the State of Utah, by and through the Attorney

General's Office, procured an Order of Contempt as against Mr. Hall finding that he was in
arrears as to his child support obligation in the sum of $9,900.00. (R. 177).
8.

That prior to March 25, 1995, Mr. Hall was aware that Ms. Hall was on welfare

assistance from the State of Utah and that she was evicted from her apartment, and Mr. Hall
assisted Ms. Hall in moving her furniture to his warehouse. (R. 177, Transcript p. 19,1. 11-23; p.
20,1 15-25).
9.

That Mr. Hall had knowledge that Ms. Hall was homeless, unemployed, and that

she had no income during 1995. (R. 177).
10.

That on or about March 25, 1995, Mr. Hall filed an affidavit and motion alleging

that he should be awarded the care, custody and control of the three minor children. (R. 177).
11.

That pursuant to the affidavit and motion, Mr. Hall further alleged that Ms Hall

was earning $1,300.00 per month and that Mr. Hall earned $1,667.00 per month. (R. 177).
12.

That based on Mr. Hall's fraudulent allegations, on June 12, 1995, the above-

entitled Court issued an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce requiring Ms. Hall to pay child
support in the sum of $291.00 per month. (R. 177).
7

13.

That Ms. Hall did not have an attorney at the time of the divorce or at the time the

Decree of Divorce was modified. (R. 177).
14.

That Ms. Hall never received any documents from Mr. Hall as to the child support

amount which Ms. Hall was ordered to pay. (R. 177).
15.

That just prior to Mr. Hall filing his Petition to take custody of the children in

April of 1995, Mr. Hall moved Ms. Hall's furniture into his warehouse, took custody of the
children, and had knowledge that Ms. Hall had drug problems and that she had been charged
with possession of a controlled substance. (R. 205, Transcript p. 20,1. 8-10).
16.

That Mr. Hall, in an Affidavit dated April 25, 1995, stated that Ms. Hall was

found by the Sheriff in a semiconscious state, having convulsions. (R. 82-83).
17.

That Ms. Hall had no knowledge about the fact that she had been ordered to pay

child support until 2001. (R. 205, Transcript p. 21,1. 5-16).
18.

That Ms. Hall has never been served with an Order to Show Cause as to any claim

for support and no judgments have ever been granted for support. (R. 205, Transcript p. 21,1. 513).
19.

That Mr. Hall in his Answer and Counterclaim requested that he be granted a

judgment for $25,000.00. (R. 131). That Mr. Hall failed to produce any evidence at trial as to the
Counterclaim. (R. 205, Transcript p. 41,1. 13-24).
20.

That Ms. Hall filed a Reply to Petitioner's Counterclaim for $25,000.00 denying

that she owed any sums to Mr. Hall. (R. 132).
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That based on the Counterclaim and Reply thereto, the issue of a child support
claim by Mr. Hall requesting judgment was one of the issues to be determined by the Court. (R.
131-132).
22.

Following trial, the District Court ruled:
It is my judgment that by clear and convincing evidence, at the time
of the first modification of this divorce matter on June 12th of 1995, the
defendant-respondent did not earn $1,300.00 per month as claimed. Indeed,
at said time, the defendant was on welfare, had received no support, as
ordered, from the plaintiff pursuant to the decree of December the 2nd
of 1991, was evicted, all of which was known to the plaintiff because he
stored her furniture and helped her move.
Hence, the claimed arrears are illusory and the product of a fraud
on this Court. They are thus set aside. At the time of the modification
referred to, the defendant was earning nothing; hence, no support was owed.

(R. 205, Transcript p. 41,1. 13-24).
23.

That the Court in its Order Modifying Decree of Divorce further stated:
That the provision requiring Respondent to pay child support in the
sum of $219.00 per month pursuant to the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
dated June 12, 1995, is determined to be void and terminated and no child
support is owed by Respondent to Petitioner from June 12, 1995, the date of
the modification, through June 17, 2002.

(R. 189).
24.

That Mr. Hall made multiple misrepresentations at trial and failed to bring

subpoenaed documents such as tax returns, bank statements, and a list of assets and debts to
support his claims. (Transcript p. 8,1. 1-25; p. 9,1. 5-25; p. 10,1. 1-25; p. 11,1. 1-25; p. 12,1. 125; p. 13,1. 1-25; p. 24,1. 1-25; p. 15,1. 1-13).
25.

That Mr. Hall's misrepresentations came to light after admitting owning assets

worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, paying debts of $3,700.00 per month, and paying all
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other living expenses, by testifying that he takes $2,000.00 or $3,000.00 out of his business when
he needs something, but not on a monthly basis. (R. 205, p. 16,1. 5-23).
Summary of Argument:
I.

Mr. Hall has not even attempted to challenge the trial court's findings relating to
its determination to set aside the 1995 Order Modifying Decree. Consequently,
those findings are presumed to be correct and supported by the record. Those
undisputed/unchallenged findings adequately support the court's ruling in this
case.

II.

Mr. Hall failed to raise any due process claim before the trial court; accordingly,
that issue is waived. Notwithstanding that, Mr. Hall's Counterclaim alleging
child support arrearages put that issue squarely before the court, and the
undisputed evidence before the court was that the prior order relating to the child
support award was procured by misrepresentation or fraud.

III.

Mr. Hall likewise failed to raise any claim that the trial court was barred from
modifying its previous order, even when such order was based on
misrepresentation or fraud. Consequently, Mr. Hall cannot raise such claim for
the first time on appeal. Moreover, Rule 60(b) explicitly provides that the court
can "set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).

IV.

In the event that Ms. Hall prevails in this appeal, she should be awarded attorney
fees and costs.

10

ARGUMENT
L

MR. HALL FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND THEREFORE INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE COURT'S LEGAL DETERMINATIONS.

Initially, Mr. Hall fails to even acknowledge that the lower court made considerable
findings relating to its determination to set aside its previous order based on misrepresentation or
fraud. This court has explicitly held that in order to:
successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, [a]n appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting InRe Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d
885, 886) (Utah 1989).
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to review the accuracy
of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case."
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
In the instant case, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
1.

That prior to March 25, 1995, Petitioner was aware that Respondent was on welfare

assistance from the State of Utah and that she was evicted from her apartment, and Petitioner
assisted Respondent in moving her furniture to his warehouse. (R. 177).
2.

That on or about March 25, 1995, Petitioner filed an affidavit and motion alleging

that he should be awarded the care, custody and control of the three minor children. (R. 177).
3.

That pursuant to the affidavit and motion, Petitioner further alleged that Respondent

was earning $1,300.00 per month and that Petitioner earned $1,667.00 per month. (R. 177).
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4.

That based on Petitioner's fraudulent allegations, on June 12, 1995, the above

entitled Court issued an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce requiring Respondent to pay child
support in the sum of $291.00 per month. (R. 177).
5.

That Petitioner had knowledge that Respondent was homeless, unemployed and that

she had no income during 1995. (R. 177).
6.

That Respondent has a hearing disability and had basically no income between June

12, 1995, the date of the modification, until June of 2002, at which time she commenced earning
$350.00 per month cleaning houses. (R. 177).
7.

That Respondent subpoenaed Petitioner ordering him to bring with him to the trial in

this matter certain income verification, i.e., tax returns, bank statements, and a list of assets and
liabilities. (R. 177).
8.

That Petitioner failed to provide said documents to Respondent's counsel or to the

Court. (R. 177).
9.

That Petitioner testified that he is paying obligations on real property, automobiles,

boats, etc., totaling $3,700.00 per month, and in addition to said obligations, Petitioner has
other normal monthly living expenses, including but not restricted to food, utilities, clothing,
insurance, etc. (R. 177).
10.

That Respondent testified that she owns no automobile and no real property, and

the only asset she owns is the furniture, furnishings and personal items which Petitioner placed in
his warehouse in 1995 and which he has refused to return to Respondent for a period of
approximately eight years, despite repeated requests by Respondent. (R. 177).
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Here, Mr. Hall has not even attempted to marshal all of the evidence in support of the
forgoing findings in an effort to show that there was insufficient evidence to support such
findings at trial. Consequently, this court must presume that all of the findings were supported by
the evidence and only determine whether the trial court appropriately applied the law to the
findings in this case. Saunders 806 P.2d at 199.
II.

INASMUCH AS MR. HALL FILED A COUNTERCLAIM SEEKING
JUDGMENT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES AGAINST MS.
HALL, ANY ISSUE RELATING TO THAT CLAIM WAS PROPERLY
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT; THEREFORE MR. HALL WAS NOT
DENIED ANY RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS.

Mr. Hall claims that he was denied some right of due process because the issue of fraud
was not pleaded. Specifically, he claims that he was not afforded timely notice of that issue,
citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). Such argument is wholly without
merit. First, Mr. Hall raises his due process claim for the first time on appeal. It is well settled
that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This
includes constitutional issues. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).
Moreover, it is well established that "fraud upon the court may be raised by [a] court sua
sponte." Kellev v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 186 (Utah App. 2000) (quoting 12 James W. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice sec. 60.21 [4][f] (3d ed.1997). At the trial court, Mr. Hall filed a
counterclaim seeking child support arrearages:
from the time that the Petitioner was awarded the care and custody of the minor
children of the parties and the respondent was ordered to pay a sum of $291.00
per month for and as child support from May 1995, she has failed to pay and owes
the petitioner a sum of approximately $25,000.00.
(R. 131).
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By doing so, Mr. Hall put the arrearage issue square before the trial court; consequently,
when Ms. Hall introduced considerable evidence that Mr. Hall had procured the prior order by
outright misrepresentation or fraud and Mr. Hall presented no evidence countering the same, the
trial court correctly and on its own accord dismissed the Mr. Hall's counterclaim and vacated the
1995 order as it related to support, ruling that "the claimed arrears are illusory and the product of
a fraud on this court. They are thus set aside."
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT, BASED ON "CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE" BEFORE IT, APPROPRIATELY SET ASIDE THE
COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDER WHICH WAS PROCURED BY
MISREPRESENTATION OR FRAUD.

Mr. Hall next claims that the trial court was without authority to modify its previous order
based on misrepresentation or fraud by Mr. Hall. Specifically, Mr. Hall claims that Ms. Hall was
barred by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure from maintaining any action for fraud.
Once again Mr. Hall raises this issue for the first time on appeal; consequently, this court should
decline to address his claim. Monson vs. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).
Furthermore, Mr. Hall utterly fails to recognize the explicit language in Rule 60(b) stating that
the court can set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Mr. Hall also argues that any claim for fraud by Ms. Hall must be initiated by a separate
or independent action. This claim likewise fails. In the present case, fraud had not been plead by
either party, however, after taking considerable evidence and making uncontroverted findings,
the District Court concluded that Mr. Hall had indeed committed a fraud on the court in 1995.
"Fraud upon the court may be raised by the court sua sponte and an appeals court may
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vacate a lower court decree on this ground." Kelley v. Kelley. 9 P.3d. 171,186 (Utah App. 2000)
(citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co..
322 U.S. 238, (1944) acknowledged the "tension between the rule that judgments are final and
the rule of equity that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief
will be granted." Id. at 244. "This equitable rule was fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized
need for correcting injustices." M. "It should be exercised cautiously, but when the occasion
demands, the power has been wielded without hesitation and equity can be interposed to
devitalize judgments." Id- at 245. "Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the
judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands
that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless
victims of deception and fraud." Toscano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 441 F.2d 930,
935 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted). In this case, therefore, the trial court, after considering all
of the evidence before it, and after entering findings which have not been challenged on appeal,
appropriately concluded, sua sponte, that there had indeed been a fraud upon the court.
Further, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-5(3) affords the trial court continuing jurisdiction to
modify orders and decrees in divorce matters. Specifically, that section provides that "[the
district court] has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care . . ." In Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990),
this court held that:
where respondent did not have accurate information about appellant's income at
the time she executed the stipulation, the trial court did not err in modifying its
prior order based on that stipulation. A party may not obtain a stipulation based
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on a misrepresentation or material omission of facts and later claim that a child
support order cannot be modified . . .
Id. at 1346.
The reasoning in Gates applies to the case at bar. Here, Mr. Hall does not challenge the
court's findings that he knew that Ms. Hall was homeless, unemployed and that she had no
income during 1995 when he filed a Petition to Modify and a supporting affidavit alleging that
she had income of $1,300.00 per month and thereby was awarded child support in the amount of
$291.00 per month. Based on that and other uncontroverted findings and the rationale in Gates,
the District Court had the authority to modify its previous default order where such order was
undisputedly based on an outright misrepresentation or fraud by Mr. Hall.
IV.

MS, HALL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL,

Ms. Hall seeks attorney fees for responding to this appeal. It is well settled "in divorce
actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the receiving spouse has prevailed on
the main issues, [this court] generally award[s] fees on appeal." Elman v. Elman. 45 P.3d 176
(Utah App. 2002) (quoting Rosendahl v. RosendahL 876 P.2d 870, 875) (Utah App. 1994). In
this case, Ms. Hall was awarded fees at trial in the sum of $3,335.70 (R.190); accordingly, in the
event that she prevails here, she would likewise be entitled to fees.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the District Court properly set aside the 1995 Order relating to
child support based on misrepresentation or fraud by Mr. Hall. Accordingly, Mr. Hall's appeal
should be dismissed and attorney fees and costs for appeal should be awarded to Ms. Hall.
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DATED this ^ d a y of April, 2004.

^ ^ O L A N J. OLSE
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
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